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In a string of papers beginning in the 1980s and a book in 1994 I have been exploring the 
structural sources of lengthy changes, whether swings or permanent shifts, in the course 
of business activity – and the course of productivity too (although productivity growth will 
not be my focus here). This has meant theoretical analyses and empirical studies of how 
non-monetary forces disturb the path of employment, unemployment, hours, and so forth 
through non-monetary channels, or mechanisms – in contrast to Keynes, for example, 
who sought to understand the employment effects transmitted through monetary channels. 
In the first stage of this research the focus was on the short-run and longer-run effects of 
actual and identified changes in preferences or technologies, which impact on the world 
real rate of interest, the world price of oil, the rate of technical progess, etc. In the last 
stage, which I am still caught up in, the focus has been on the long-run effects of various 
economic institutions, which tend to impact on the responsiveness of businesses, the 
flexibility of markets etc. 
                                                                  
1  McVickar Professor of Political Economy Director, Center on Capitalism & Society at the Earth 
Institute, Columbia University. Most of my past papers in the area of this lecture, including those 








It would be a theoretical error to say that such actual shocks in no case generate 
a “swing.” In the structuralist models, some of those shocks are able to generate a big 
“down” followed by a recovery. Clearly, a fiscal shock might be neutral in the long run 
but be contractionary in the short run, so that employment would at first decline and then 
tend gradually to return to its original path. (I am inclined to infer from the data that such a 
swing actually happened to several economies in continental western Europe.) A reverse 
shock of this kind would cause employment to rise at first, then sink back. 
In between these two stages, however, are several papers that take up a wholly 
different category of influences on economic activity (and growth too), namely, future 
prospects. Accordingly, at any moment there can occur a “prospective” shock, meaning, 
a new future prospect or a (new) change in some already anticipated prospect. (I leave 
the terminology somewhat fluid.) This is different from Keynes’s “animal spirits” in that it 
these prospects refer to events in the future that would impact on the willingness of 
existing firms and start-up entrepreneurs to invest and the willingness of investment 
bankers and the stock market to finance them. Keynes was content simply to treat the 
“spirits” of the investing firm as exogenous, thus effectively introducing an autonomous 
component into investment demand – possibly because there are so many future 
prospects that may be influential in determining the “spirits.” 
In the first part of this lecture I am going to survey or in one case introduce 







activity and show how, theoretically, each prospect transmits through the capital market 
channel an effect on the course of economic activity, starting from the present moment; 
and in each case I will point to some evidence of an impact on economic activity. In the 
second part I am going to try to get a sense of the quantitative importance of future 
prospects in general – call it speculation about the future – relative to the importance of 
unexpected developments actually observed. 
 
FUTURE ‘DEBT BOMBS,’ PRODUCTIVITY SURGES AND WARS 
In the category of future prospects perhaps the oldest topic is the effects in the present of 
some newly formed expectation of a future “debt bomb,” as I have dubbed it – for 
example, the enactment of a tax cut with delayed effect and a sunset provision (so there is 
some small interval over which there is a big government deficit). Another topic in this 
category is the sudden expectation of a future step-increase in productivity at some 
specified date. A third topic, which I want to introduce here, is the expectation of the start 
of a war and of the end of a war. Maybe a terrorist attack would be a more modern way 
to interpret it. In all these cases I want to discuss in a highly informal way some historical 
evidence relating to each of these cases. I will take these up in the above order. 
As I may have revealed already, I will not suppose that there are differences of 
opinion about the magnitude or the time of the prospective events; and where it is 
interesting to introduce a probability, it is a subjective probability held by all. The aim is 







view to the point where it comes to be nearly universal. 
 
Future ‘debt bombs’ and pension overhang 
The literature on the present expectation of a future fiscal shock goes back quite far. A 
Keynesian treatment of the subject is offered by Olivier Blanchard in 1981. (I may have 
had an influence in that paper as we discussed future shocks in 1978, although my 
analysis was not regarded as satisfactory and I did not pursue it.) However, the 
proposition that the enactment of an explosion of transfer payments or tax cuts in the 
neighborhood of some future date t1 will be a depressant for real asset prices at that time 
and that the public’s grasp of that prospect will have repercussions for the level of real 
asset prices in the present is much more general. A few years ago Hian Teck Hoon and I 
set out a closed-economy model showing that the sudden expectation of such a tax cut, if 
expected by managers of firms, will immediately cause a drop in the shadow price they 
attach to a unit of the business asset.2 
It is easy to establish this proposition in terms of the sort of turnover/training 
model that Hoon and I have frequently used, provided we appeal to the non-Ricardian 
property that government debt is net wealth. Then the increase in the public debt around 
t1 causes the long-term real interest rate to be elevated at that time, with the result that 
the shadow price at that time must be lower than it otherwise would have been, evaluated 
at the original level of the stock of the business asset, which is simply the stock of trained 
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employees. By an inductive argument it follows that the shadow price at the present 
moment t0 is also lower than it was; in fact, we don’t need such an argument, since the 
integral giving the present shadow price involves interest rates after t1, which are 
increased, so the value of the integral is reduced. A beautiful observation noticed by Hian 
Teck is that the short term real interest rate may actual fall, since consumption will jump 
up and thereupon be steadily falling, thus causing the real rate of interest required by 
savers to be gradually falling down to their elevated future level. 
Unfortunately this model, which I want to stick to here, will not deliver such 
results in the case of a small open economy, for in that case real interest rates are given by 
the world capital market, which the economy is not large enough to affect. To obtain the 
proposition we want for a small open economy Hoon and I turn to a customer-market 
model.3 Then there is an elevation of domestic real interest rates in the future, as a result 
of the crowding in of more public debt, which crowds out overseas or domestic 
customers. (Hian Teck has been able to prove that there is immediately a real exchange 
rate depreciation with the expectation of the future tax cut, which is followed by a gradual 
exchange rate recovery. But I will not say more about this analysis here.) 
Some evidence. There is positive, though indirect, evidence of the significance that such 
fiscal prospects have for the level of economic activity. In the past several years investors 
in a number of countries have come to be appreciate that their country faces a very large 
overhang of pension liabilities in relation to present projections of GDP, owing either to 







were setting benefit levels or to having disregarded the coming bulge of baby boomers 
who will soon be entering into their retirement years. Allison Schrager, a PhD student at 
Columbia, has taken this opportunity to regress the average price-earnings ratio (and also 
the average price-dividend ratio) on the projected pension benefits to GDP ratio for a 
cross-section of OECD economies, using data prepared for the European Commission. 
The results show a statistically significant coefficient of the right (negative) sign on the 
pension variable. If this is in fact the case, it means that the prospect of tax increases and 
mounting paper wealth from pension entitlements do indeed impact on the capital market, 
just as the theory implies. There is plenty of other evidence supporting the belief that a 
decrease of share prices has contractionary consequences for the level of economic 
activity as measured by the unemployment rate and participation rates. 
So far, then, the theory is doing well enough. 
 
Future productivity surges 
To analyze the sudden expectation of a future step-increase, or lift, to productivity we can 
use the turnover-training model, which is generally very convenient – when it can do the 
job. A simple analysis is provided in a paper I wrote with Fitoussi, Jestaz and Zoega.4  
The basic proposition is nicely illustrated by the phase diagram in Figure 1. Here I have 
simplified the model further by abandoning rising marginal hiring costs and replacing that 
with constant hiring costs. Then the locus of points at which the stock of employees is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     







constant at a firm is horizontal. (If employment is increased, the quit rate is increased as a 
result, with the consequence that there must be an equal increase in the hire rate; but since 
the derivative of the hire rate with respect to the shadow price of the employee is infinite 
in the constant-costs case, no increase in the shadow price is required to maintain a 
steady state at the increased employment level.) The phase diagram shows that the 
shadow price jumps up, causing employment to grow until t1, at which point the path of 
the system must have just reached the new saddle path; from that point, the system 
follows the saddle path, proceeding toward the new rest point. (I omit details concerning 
wealth.) The dynamic system is set out in the Appendix for readers interested in seeing 
the equations underlying the phase diagram. 
To gain the essential insight we need only consider the integral expression giving 
the value of the shadow price at the present time, t0. The step-increase in the prospective 
future rents on the business asset – the employees – unambiguously increases the value of 
the integral, evaluated at the initial employment path. And, again, any such increase in the 
shadow price of the employee, unaccompanied by any increase in the opportunity cost of 
training additional employees, unambiguously stimulates a sharp increase in hiring, which 
pulls up employment; it is implied to continue to rise until the expected moment when the 
productivity surge is expected to occur. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4  See Phelps and Zoega, ‘Structural booms: productivity expectations and asset valuations,’ 
Economic Policy, 32, April 2001. See also J.-P. Fitoussi, D. Jestaz, E. Phelps and G. Zoega, “Roots 









As so often happens, the ink had hardly dried on the manuscript for the April 
2000 Brookings meeting where this paper was presented when another paper emerged, 
this one by Beaudry and Portier, conveying the same basic idea in a more neoclassical 
sort of model; then still another paper appeared, also independently, by a Columbia PhD 
student, Steffen Reichold.5 
Some evidence.  How can we adduce evidence that the investment boom of the late 
1990s in the US economy and several others did rest, at least to an important degree, on 
newfound expectations of a lift to productivity on the horizon? And, similarly, how can we 
test the thought that the great investment boom of the 1920s was likewise driven by 
expectations of rapid productivity growth over the future? Perhaps we can never obtain 
strong enough evidence to satisfy all skeptics. However, for me at any rate, it is important 
circumstantial evidence supporting that interpretation of the 1990s boom that productivity 
growth has in fact been startlingly rapid in the four years beginning in 2000 and appears to 
be slowing down only very gradually. With productivity growth so rapid in those years, it 
is easy for me to believe that many managers in industry had information in the second half 
of the 1990s leading them to expect a very substantial lift to productivity and hence to 
investment returns in the next several years. Now consider the 1920s boom. The parallels 
of that boom with the 1990s boom have led several of us to dig out the Kendrick data on 
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verified; Steffen Reichold, “’New Economy’ and ‘Productivity Slowdown’: Can Learning about 







productivity growth in that bygone era. I was stunned to see in the Commerce 
Department volume Long Term Economic Growth 1860-1965 that productivity lifted 
off onto a much higher path during the 1930s.6 Alex Field’s paper a few months 
calculated total factor productivity growth rates to show just how remarkable technical 
progress was between 1929 and 1941. 
I alluded to the productivity gains in the 1930s and, to date, in the 2000s in a 
couple of pieces in the financial press where I agued that Alan Greenspan was mistaken 
to think that the recent spate of productivity gains translates into high employment: if the 
productivity gains were already anticipated in the mid- and late 1990s and were precisely 
the inspiration for the wave of new investments at that time, then the realization of these 
gains will not occasion another wave of investment; the realized gains are “how booms 
end, not how they begin.”  7 Employment in this decade too is still pretty slumpy, though 
now recovering at a rate so rapid that – if it holds up – the unemployment rate ought to 
reach the neighborhood of 5 per cent by the end of the year. The question is only whether 
other forces may stall that march back to normalcy, as happened in the late 1930s when 
the clouds of war stopped in its tracks the recovery from the depression. 
 
War prospects. 
                                                                  
6  Edmund Phelps, Interview, Il Sole/24 Ore, Rome, July 2003. See also the short article by 
Alexander J. Field, “The Most Technologically Progressive Decade of the Century,” American 
Economic Review, 93, September 2003, 1399-1413. 
7  Phelps, “False Hopes for the Economy – and False Fears,” Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2003 and 
Phelps, “”Crash, Bang, Wallop,” Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2004. These and two other 
commentaries are assembled in my paper, “The Boom and the Slump: A Causal Account of the 







The essence of my thesis is as follows. At the present time, the value, to be denoted q(0), 
that a firm’s manager would put on having an additional functioning employee is a 
probability mixture of the value of that employee in the scenario in which war breaks out, 
weighted by the subjective probability of war, p, and the value in the scenario in which 
war does not break out, weighted by the probability the war does not break out, 1 – p. 
The war scenario gives a lower value, since the manager anticipates that there will be an 
increased tax burden on the firm’s profits or sales or both in the event of the war. The 
conclusion that can be deduced is that any small increase in the subjective probability of 
war lowers the value of the probability mixture – the so called “expected value” of the 
two integrals (the one the no-war integral, the other the war integral). The argument for 
that conclusion involves the point that the firm’s reactions in the event of war do not have 
to be factored into the result, since small adjustments by the firm in its hiring rate will not 
have a first-order effect on the value of the integral, the hiring rates having been in the 
neighborhood of their q-maximizing levels to begin with. 
Another proposition that is obvious at least to economists is that, with the passage 
of time, the date at which the war is feared to break out draws nearer – unless t1 is 
pushed back one day (or more!) for every day that goes by after t0. So the present 
discounted value of having an extra employee, which means discounting back to the 
current time t, not to the initial time, t0, is falling, since the losses from the war in the 
event it occurs are getting nearer, hence discounted less heavily. 







at which the war is hoped to end draws nearer – unless that date, t2, say, is pushed back 
one day or more for every day that the war goes on after t1. Here the gains from the 
war’s end are being discounted less heavily as the end of the war nears. 
Some evidence. If I am not mistaken, then, this analysis leads to the proposition that the 
prospect of war ahead causes a drop in the shadow prices put on business assets. In 
almost any theory, there will be, in reflection of that drop, a sympathetic drop in share 
prices too. And if, during a war, the prospective time left to go before the war’s end 
keeps shrinking as expected or even faster than expected, these shadow prices – and 
share prices too – will tend to be recovering. Is this what happens, at least in normal 
cases? Certainly the evidence in the years leading up to World War II bear out this story. 
Painting with a broad brush, I would say, going largely by my recollection of the data, that 
share prices fell and fixed investment expenditures as a share of GDP fell in the United 
States from 1937 to 1941. The same was true, as I recall, in the Netherlands over the 
late 1930s. Then, during the war years 1942 to 1945, the stock market in the United 
States was strongly rising – in a recovery mode. 
I would just add that, as you may know, the real prices of shares did not recover 
fully to their lofty levels of 1936 and 1937 for quite some time – not until the last years of 
the 1960s, if I remember correctly. I would say by way of explanation – entirely in the 
spirit of my thesis that future prospects are important – that the cloud of the cold war 
came over the US economy by 1948, blocking any chance of a full recovery. With the 









If these future prospects and possibly others not treated here are empirically important, 
then we can conclude that real-life economies with an active commercial character are 
almost never vibrating up and down along their saddle paths. They are almost always off 
the saddle path. Somewhat surprisingly, the trajectory of shadow value of the employee in 
the above model jumps off the saddle path in spite of the simplifying postulate there of 
constant (rather than increasing) marginal hiring costs. 
The pressing question now is whether the changes in future prospects are 
pronounced enough from one year to the next or from one decade or era to the next to 
generate a generally important – and typically fluctuating – discrepancy from the saddle 
path. I would like in the second part of this lecture to tackle that question. 
 
 
JUST HOW MUTABLE IS THE OVERALL FUTURE PROSPECT? 
A long-time theme of mine regarding fluctuations is that most of the national economies of 
the past few centuries are vicissitudinous – better, mutable – especially the more 
capitalist economies and those highly interdependent with the capitalist world.8 I mean that 
a capitalist economy is always changing qualitatively and often lastingly. So the description 
of a theoretical economy given by a stochastic steady-state model does not really fit this 
                                                                  
8  In Webster’s: vicissitude noun  1 the quality of being changeable  2 the natural change or 







sort of economy. Maybe some macro statistics will pass some tests for stationarity but, if 
so, that may indicate only that it takes a few decades for an economy to transform itself; it 
doesn’t mean that we can use a model estimated on 19th century data to obtain the best 
possible prediction of, say, the rate of technical progress or the long-term natural 
unemployment rate. Although some of these “parameters” appear to be trendless, they 
also appear to be capable of shifting perceptibly from one half-century to another. Some 
theorists speak of regime change or model change, but why not admit that the regime is 
always evolving, sometimes abruptly, and the model with it? I have to add that I am not 
exactly sure what it means to speak of the best possible, or true, prediction or the 
expected value of these things: using what model? 
As Part I showed, the shadow value of the business asset is capable of jumping 
off the saddle path; in fact, the shadow value may never be on the saddle path for a single 
day of its life except to pass through to the other side on some occasions. (This is true 
even though I posited constant costs of hiring.) But how much do these shadow prices 
move in fact? And do their movements, such as they are, match up with shifts (surges) 
and swings in investment activities of the various kinds – hiring, customer chasing 
(advertising, cutting markups), plant and office construction, etc.? 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
by or filled with vicissitudes.  mutable adj.  1 prone to change  2 capable of or liable to mutation  







Inferential movements in the shadow values 
Hian Teck Hoon chanced to read a paper by Casey Mulligan that looks into the part 
played by public finance distortion in the movements of labor supply of American 
workers over the period 1889-1996.9 For his neoclassical model Mulligan adopts the 
neoclassical model of labor-leisure choice, with its condition  h v L L C = - ) , ( MRS , 
where the MRS function gives the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between 
consumption and work, or “marginal value of time” in terms of the final good, and is 
increasing in current consumption C and in hours worked L, hence decreasing in leisure; 
the right-hand side variable,  h v , is the after-tax hourly wage rate. The latter is related to 
the firms’ demand wage  f v and to the proportional tax rate t on after-tax wage income 
by  f h v v
1 ) 1 (
- + ” t . Invoking pure competition, he equates  f v to the marginal product 
of labor, MPL. The result is  MPL L L C
1 ) 1 ( ) , ( MRS
- + = - t . The implication is that 
an increase of t, in decreasing the right-hand side, operates to decrease hours, given 
consumption and the value of MPL. Mulligan argues from his empirical exercise that 
marginal tax rates are well correlated with labor-leisure distortions at low frequencies, 
but they cannot explain the distortions during the Great Depression, the Second World 
War and the 1980s: the decade-to-decade fluctuations in consumption, wages, and 
labor supply do not jibe very well with this competitive equilibrium model. 
From the perspective of my structuralist models, the difficulty with this 
competitive-equilibrium theory – adopted wholesale by the real-business-cycle school in 
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the 1980s – is that it lacks business assets and the possibility of corresponding 
fluctuations in the shadow values attaching to those assets; as a result, the model is 
hopelessly myopic. Hian Teck, viewing the matter accordingly, reasoned that to 
understand the depth of the downturn in the 1930s it might be of crucial help to 
introduce such shadow prices. From customer market theory, Hian Teck derived a 
contrasting employment equation: In the Phelps-Winter model, a firm generally profits 
from the sluggishness of information, for it can “mark up” its price above marginal cost 
without at once losing all its customers; this transient monopoly power gives value to its 
current stock of customers. Let m denote the markup (P – MC)/P, where P is price 
and MC is marginal cost. Then it is straightforward to deduce that 1 + m ” y , where 
the function y  makes m inversely related to q ~, the shadow price that firms attach to a 
customer when taken as a ratio to how much output a customer has to be supplied. 
(That ratio is fully analogous to Tobin’s Q ratio.) In this model, the analogue to 
Mulligan’s labor-equilibrium relationship is  MPL q L L C
1 1 )] ~ ( [ ) 1 ( ) , ( MRS
- - + = - y t . 
If we substitute for MPL the parameter L and, in the closed economy case, substitute 
LL for C in MRS, then L is fully determined. An increase of q ~ pulls up the right-hand 
side (i.e., it increases the  h v  that firms are willing to offer); and, since 
) , ( MRS L L L - L  is doubly increasing in L, that induces an increase in hours supplied. 
Thus the markup wedge between net pay and labor’s marginal value productivity joins 
the tax wedge as a potential factor in the determination of the equilibrium (i.e., correct-







an analysis because they move in opposite directions, so the one helps to escape from 
the other. 
My point here, after that lengthy exposition, is that we can infer what the 1930s 
shadow price of customers must have dropped to from the 1920s by solving for the q ~ 
ratio that solves the equation, given the data and given our “knowledge” of the functions 
appearing in the equations. We can do that for each decade of the past century, thus 
obtaining a century of inferred q ~ ratios attaching to the business asset we call the 
customer. 
To do the same with the turnover-training model we can use the equation giving 
the incentive wage as a function of the unemployment rate and the shadow price of the 
functioning employee to solve for the shadow price that delivers the correct wage rate, 
taking account of tax rates. Thus we could calculate decadal levels of the shadow value 
of the employee. 
Since these shadow values of the various business assets have a lot of work to 
do to reconcile the equation with the observed employment levels in the 1930s, the 
World War II years (1941-45) and the 1980s, one can presume that the required 
shadow values will exhibit quite a lot of fluctuation from decade to decade. This is one 
piece of circumstantial evidence for believing that future prospects are important: Over 
the past century, the world real interest rate, trend growth rates of national productivity 
and tax rates have not show enough variation to be able by themselves to push the 







1980s. I admit, though, that I have not carried out that project; I am just surmising from 
impressions gleaned from the data. 
 
What do share price time series say? 
To obtain another somewhat indirect view of the movements of the shadow prices of 
business assets we might do well to examine the time-series of stock-price indexes, 
such as the Standard and Poor 500 index (and its predecessors). 
We would like to find evidence that would help to establish (or to disestablish, 
as you like) the proposition that share prices are driven by subject understandings of 
future prospects to an important degree, not just by unexpected developments in the 
situation and performance of the economy. How to do that? To do that we need to 
distinguish the actual change of the share price level from the change that was previously 
expected; then we have to decompose this into the component attributable to surprises 
in observable things and the component presumably reflecting unanticipated revisions, 
based possibly on reappraisals of existing information or surprising new information, of 
the economy’s future prospects. The dichotomy is between the unexpected changes in 
observed levels of present variables and the unexpected changes in the forecast future. 
To this end, let Rx denote the logarithmic rate of change of the variable x; and 
let F( x ) denote the expected, or forecast, value of x. In this notation, the familiar 








F(R(p)) = [F(r) - d/p ], 
where p denotes the share-price level, R gives its rate of change, and F gives the 
expectation about that rate of change; r is the short-term real rate of interest; and the 
last term is the dividend-per-share as a ratio to price per share (hereafter, the dividend-
price ratio). Then subtracting the actual R( p ) from both sides and multiply both sides 
by minus one we get 
  R (p ) - F(R(p)) = d/p + R( e ) - F (r) + [ R(p) - R(e)], 
where e denotes earnings per share. The first three terms represent the observable part: 
share prices may have gone up more than expected (or fallen less) because earnings 
growth was good or the dividend payout ratio was good in relation to the expected real 
interest rate, as embodied in Treasury inflation-protected bonds, say. The component in 
the square brackets, however, is the rise of share prices relative to earnings, and 
presumably is driven by changes in future prospects (although possibly some present 
factors get in there in the real world). 
The attached Figure 2 plots the first component (sans the real rate of interest, 
which could not be organized in the remaining time) and plots in the same chart the 
second component for the period from 1871 to the recent time. It is clear that both 
components show a great deal of movement. It will be interesting to see whether the 
latter component is a better predictor of good times ahead than the first component. In 







of the future, since the latter component is all about the future. But deciding this 
question will require a careful analysis. The answer is not apparent at a glance. 
CONCLUDING 
I have been arguing that macroeconomics must incorporate future prospects if it is to 
capture the big swings in economic activity in anything approaching their entirety. Not 
only that: without doing so our models will not be able to speak to many policy issues of 
the day. For example, the supply siders say, cut tax rates – and after that, cut them 
again, then again; the budgetary deficit is, for them, not important, it seems. Then Robert 
Rubin and Lawrence Summers hinted at a counter-theory which says that budgetary 
deficits also have a contractionary effect operating through the capital market – through 
the Wall Street channel. Hian Teck and I have managed to put the argument on a 
theoretical footing: A current and prospective pay-down of the public debt would 
operate to elevate asset prices – an effect that exists whether or not the long rate of 
interest is simultaneously lowered; and that effect could – again, theoretically – elevate 
the normalized shadow price of customers, q ~, by enough to pull up  h v  and L by more 
than the contractionary effect from the supply-sider channel pushes them down. In this 
framework, one cannot expect to understand well the medium-term responses of 
employment (here hours) to fiscal shocks without considering the asset price responses 
to such shocks, in particular, to current as well as prospective tax changes. The increase 
in the tax rates introduced in the mid-1990s under the Clinton administration may have 







competitive equilibrium framework, because the expectation of a decline in the debt-











The Dynamic System of the Turnover-Training Model 
 
A simple dynamic system to back the story in Figure 4 is the open economy model in 
Hoon-Phelps (1992) and Phelps (1994). The closed economy would also serve. Here, 
firms’ assets are their employees, which are costly to train. There are rising marginal training 
costs. The real interest rate in terms of the economy’s product is equal to the world real 
interest rate, r*, which is taken to be fixed. 
 
  Output is an increasing function of “augmented” labor, Lt NP
t, where L t denotes 
labor augmentation at time t and NP
t denotes the number of employees engaged in 
production rather than training. We add fixed capital in a simple way by admitting imports of 
equipment on short-term lease from overseas suppliers with zero transport costs. When 
employees move from producing to training they need the same equipment. The amount of 
capital per augmented employee, K/Lt N, is determined by the demand function, k, which 
is decreasing in the given unit rental, r* + d. Output per augmented employee allocated to 
production is given by f(k (r* + d)) and the rental per augmented employee is (r* + d ) 
k(r* + d). Output and rental per unaugmented production worker are Ltj(r* +d) and Lt 
R(r* +d), respectively. 
 
  In this setting, each identical firm, to maximize shareholder value, chooses its 
current hire rate, h, and its wage, v, to maximize a Hamiltonian function. That function 
involves the current proportion of employees engaged in training per hiree, given by b(h), 
which is an increasing function of h; the mortality rate, q; the quit rate, z, which is a function 
of the unemployment rate, u, of the current wage expected to be set at other firms relative 
to its own wage, ve/v, and of nonwage income, yW, as a ratio to its wage; the shadow price 
the firm optimally awards itself for every current employee, q; and its current stock of 
employees, N. The current-value Hamiltonian is 
 
       {Ltj(r* +d) -b(h) L tj(r* +d) – Lt R(r* + d) – v  
    +q [h - z((1-u)ve/v, yW/v) - q ]} N. 
 
  The necessary conditions for a maximum give three equations. These equations 
together with the equilibrium (i.e., correct-expectations) condition, ve = v, yield the three 
basic equations of the equilibrium path. It is perhaps more convenient to express these three 







and normalized nonwage income, yW/Lj. This introduces the actual and expected growth 
rate of L, to be denoted l. 
 
  For a maximum, q must satisfy the arbitrage equation 
 
  d(q/Lj)/dt = - [1 + h b’(h) - b(h) – R/j - v/Lj] 
     + [z (1-u, (yW/Lj)/(v/Lj)) + q + r*-l] q/Lj.   (1) 
 
It says that a capital gain (loss) is needed to make up any shortfall (surplus) of the marginal 
profitability of employees, Lj [1 + h b’(h) - b(h) – R/j - v/Lj], over the economic 
interest and depreciation entailed, which is q [z + q + r*-l]. 
 
   
  The optimal wage balances the marginal benefit of a small increase of the wage 
rate that results from the consequent reduction in the quit rate against the marginal cost in 
terms of the payroll on existing employees of the same small rise of the wage rate. This gives 
the condition 
 
  v/Lj = (q/Lj)[(1-u)z1(1-u, (yW/Lj)/(v/Lj)) 
      + (yW/Lj)/(v/Lj)z2(1-u, (yW/Lj)/(v/Lj))].    (2) 
 
Here both lefthand and righthand sides have been multiplied by v/Lj for typographical 
simplicity. The original righthand side gives the two effects on the quit rate of an increase in 
pay, both effects multiplied by the normalized worth of the quits averted. The original 
righthand side is equal to one. 
 
  The optimum scale of current hiring is at the point where the cost of speeding up by 
the amount of one new hire (as a ratio to the employee stock) would be just worth the gain 
per unit time from adding employees at that faster rate. The condition is b’(h) = q/Lj, 
which is convenient to write in the form 
 
  h = f (q/Lj),                        (3) 
 
where f’(q/Lj) > 0. Using that, we have the equation of motion for employment, 
 
dN/dt  = [f (q/Lj) - z (1-u, (yW/Lj)/(v/Lj)) - q ](1 - u),    (4) 
 








  The astute reader may have noticed that the above paragraph invokes “rising 
marginal hiring costs,” which serves to ensure an interior maximum with some positive hiring, 
generally speaking, and always positive output. In contrast, the phase diagram in Figure 1 
simplifies by invoking “constant hiring costs,” so that a small jump of q induces the firms to 
switch their entire work forces from the producing mode to the training/orientation mode. 
The conclusions that are the focus are not lost if we follow instead we posit rising marginal 
hiring costs as in this Appendix. 
 
The stationary loci.  To obtain the Asset Price Curve, which is the stationary locus for 
normalized q in Figure 4 we need only set the left-hand side of equation (1) equal to zero, 
use (3) to substitute for h, and use (2), which implicitly gives v/Lj as a function, say, 
Vs(1-u, q/Lj; yW/Lj). This gives the stationary locus 
 
  0= -[1+f(q/Lj)b’(f (q/Lj)) -b(f (q/Lj)) –R/j -Vs(1-u, q/Lj; yW/Lj)] 
     + [z (1-u, (yW/Lj)/Vs(1-u, q/Lj; yW/Lj) + q + r* - l] q/Lj. (5) 
 
Given yW/Lj, the normalized share price can be shown to be decreasing in 1-u. With a 
standard Blanchard-Yaari formulation of the accumulation of nonwage income, Hoon and 
Phelps show that the long run relationship is also negatively sloped. 
 
  To obtain the Employment Curve we proceed similarly, setting the left-hand side 
equal to zero and again using (2) to substitute Vs(1-u, q/Lj; yW/Lj) for v/Lj. This gives 
the stationary locus 
 
0 = [f (q/Lj) -z(1-u, (yW/Lj)/Vs(1-u, q/Lj; yW/Lj)) - q](1 -u).  (6) 
 
Given yW/Lj, the employment variable can be shown to be increasing in the normalized 
shadow price. Again, with a Blanchard-Yaari formulation, the long run relationship is also 
positively sloped. 
 
Dynamics. A common short cut in analyzing dynamic systems takes the more slow-moving 
of the two state variables, here the non-wage income variable, to be temporarily constant 
and analyzes the dynamics of the faster-moving of these variables, employment, accordingly. 
Here, this subsystem is simply equations (1) and (4) after making the substitutions for v and 
h from (2) and (3): 
 
   d(q/Lj)/dt = -[1+ f(q/Lj)b’(f (q/Lj)) –b(f (q/Lj)) -R/j –Vs(1-u,q/Lj)] 
     + [z (1-u, (yW/Lj)/Vs(1-u, q/Lj; yW/Lj)) + q + r* - l] q/Lj, (7) 
 








Analysis of this medium-run system gives the equilibrium motion along a negatively sloped 
“saddle path” leading (from either side) to the intersection of the Asset Price Curve and the 
Employment Curve corresponding to the given yW/Lj – dubbed here the medium-term rest 
point. 
 
  One kind of shock to this system is a sudden increase in the expected rate of labor 
augmentation, l. Analysis of this system yields the intuitive result that such a shift of l 
generates an upward shift of both the Asset Price Curve and the saddle path, hence a jump 
of the normalized share price, followed by a gradual sinking of that variable to its higher 
medium-term rest-point value and a gradual rise of employment toward its likewise higher 
medium-term rest-point value.  
 
  Even if real-life economies fluctuated only up and down this saddle path, there 
might be a reason to add a normalized stock-market indicator to the employment growth 
equation. Such an indicator could serve as a proxy for omitted asset stocks, such as 
customers and even fixed capital, which is rarely well measured. 
 
The shock highlighted in Figure 4 brings out the major value added of a stock-
market indicator. This shock is a sudden anticipation of a one-time shift at a future date in 
the path of productivity and thus of profits per unit of assets. That shock requires a difficult 
analysis with respect to the aftermath of the shock, since the quantum jump in productivity, 
once it actually occurs, has a quantum effect on the wealth-to-productivity ratio, so that 
ratio can no longer be held constant for analytical simplicity. But our interest is only in the 
existence of an expansion phase following the sudden anticipation of the future productivity 
shift. The reasoning to our conclusions that the asset price immediately jumps and that 
employment, if initially steady, will then be rising until the moment of the productivity shift 
appears inescapable. In such a ‘bubble’ scenario, a normalized stock-market indicator can 























































































































d/P + dE/E dp/p - dE/E
 